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10 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

11 **COUNTY OF SAN MATEO**

12 DANIEL OCAMPO, Individually and on Behalf  
13 of All Others Similarly Situated,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 DFINITY USA RESEARCH LLC, DFINITY  
17 STIFTUNG, AH CAPITAL MANAGEMENT  
18 LLC, POLYCHAIN CAPITAL, DOMINIC  
19 WILLIAMS, and JOHN DOES 1-20,

20 Defendants.

Case No. 21-CIV-03843

**FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION  
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE  
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1 Plaintiff Daniel Ocampo (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by  
2 Plaintiff’s undersigned attorneys, alleges the following based upon personal knowledge as to Plaintiff’s  
3 own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters based on the investigation conducted by  
4 and through Plaintiff’s attorneys, which included, among other things, a review of governmental filings  
5 and commentary, publicly available reports and information, analyst and media reports, and other  
6 commentary analysis. Plaintiff’s investigation into the matters alleged herein is continuing and many  
7 relevant facts are known only to, or are exclusively within the custody and control of, the Defendants.  
8 Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein  
9 after a reasonable opportunity for formal discovery.

10 **NATURE AND SUMMARY OF ACTION**

11 1. Plaintiff brings this securities class action under §§5, 12(a)(1), and 15 of the Securities Act  
12 of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) against (1) Dfinity USA Research LLC ( the “Company”); (2) Dfinity’s  
13 parent organization, Dfinity Foundation (“the “Foundation”, together with the Company, collectively  
14 referred to as “Dfinity”); (3) Polychain Capital (“Polychain”); (4) AH Capital Management LLC  
15 (“Andreessen”); and (5) Dfinity’s controlling executive and director, Dominic Williams (together with  
16 Polychain and Andreessen, to as the “Controlling Defendants”).<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff alleges that Defendants sold  
17 unregistered securities to investors in violation of the Securities Act. Defendants are liable in their  
18 capacities as issuers, statutory sellers, and/or direct or indirect offerors of ICP.

19 2. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all investors who purchased Internet Computer  
20 Project tokens (“ICP” tokens) on or after May 10, 2021 and were damaged thereby.

21 3. ICP qualify as securities under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1).  
22 The purchase of ICP constitutes an investment contract as ICP purchasers, including Plaintiff, provided  
23 consideration (in the form of fiat, *i.e.*, U.S. dollars or other cryptocurrencies) in exchange for ICP. ICP is  
24 an investment in a common enterprise and purchasers reasonably expected to derive profits from their  
25 ownership of ICP. Defendants promoted this profit motive as a reason to purchase ICP.

26 4. No registration statements have been filed with the SEC or have been in effect with respect  
27 to the ICP offerings alleged herein.

28 <sup>1</sup> Dfinity, DF, and the Controlling Defendants are collectively referred to as “Defendants.”



1 12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants as a result of acts of Defendants  
2 occurring in and/or aimed at the state of California in connection with Defendants’ unregistered offer and  
3 sale of securities in violation of §§5, 12(a)(1), and 15 of the Securities Act.

4 13. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they reside in or have their  
5 principal places of business in California.

6 **PARTIES**

7 14. Plaintiff Daniel Ocampo is an individual and a resident of the State of California. Plaintiff  
8 made purchases of ICP Tokens shortly after the opening of the Genesis Launch on May 10, 2021 through  
9 June 25, 2021 on the U.S. based cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase, and suffered losses on those  
10 investments as a result of the scheme alleged herein.

11 15. Defendant Dfinity USA Research LLC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of  
12 business at 411 Acacia Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94306. Dfinity operates as a U.S.-based subsidiary of  
13 its parent organization, Dfinity Foundation.

14 16. Defendant Dfinity Foundation, is a Zurich-based not-for-profit organization or “stiftung,”  
15 and is the corporate entity behind all of ICP’s operations. The Foundation created ICP and, at all relevant  
16 times, solicited purchases of ICP by Plaintiff and the Class for its own benefit and the benefit of its  
17 executives and owners.

18 17. Defendant Dominic Williams is the Founder, President, member of the Board of Directors,  
19 and Chief Scientist of Dfinity and Internet Computer project and has been since October 2016. Williams is  
20 a resident of Santa Clara County. Williams exercised control over Dfinity and directed and/or authorized,  
21 directly or indirectly, the sale and/or solicitation of ICP to the public.

22 18. Defendant AH Capital Management (“Andreessen”) is a private venture capital firm founded  
23 in 2009. Andreessen is California company with its headquarters in Menlo Park, California in this County.  
24 Andreessen exercised control over Dfinity and directed and/or authorized, directly or indirectly, the sale  
25 and/or solicitation of ICP to the public. Andreesen is also known by “AH Capital Management, L.L.C.”

26 19. Defendant Polychain Capital is a cryptocurrency investment firm managing portfolios of  
27 digital assets and has been since 2016. Polychain is headquartered in San Francisco, California. Polychain  
28

1 exercised control over Dfinity and directed and/or authorized, directly or indirectly, the sale and/or  
2 solicitation of ICP to the public.

3 20. The defendants referred to in ¶¶17-19 are referred to as the “Controlling Defendants.”

4 **SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS**

5 **A. Background of Cryptocurrency**

6 21. A cryptocurrency is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of exchange or a store of  
7 value or both. Cryptocurrencies use various cryptographic principles to secure transactions, control the  
8 creation of additional units, and verify the transfer of the underlying digital assets.

9 22. Created in 2009, Bitcoin was the world’s first decentralized cryptocurrency.

10 23. With a market capitalization of approximately \$1.4 trillion, Bitcoin is also at the top of the  
11 cryptocurrency market by a wide margin.

12 24. Bitcoin functions as a ledger that tracks the ownership and transfer of every bitcoin in  
13 existence. This ledger is called a blockchain.

14 25. Blockchains act as the central technical commonality across most cryptocurrencies. While  
15 each blockchain may be subject to different technical rules and permissions based on the preferences of its  
16 creators, they are typically designed to achieve the similar goal of decentralization.

17 26. Accordingly, blockchains are generally designed as a framework of incentives that  
18 encourages some people to do the work of validating transactions while allowing others to take advantage  
19 of the network. In order to ensure successful validation, those completing the validation are also required  
20 to solve a “Proof of Work” problem by expending computational resources, which has the effect of making  
21 a blockchain more accurate and secure. For Bitcoin, those who validate the blockchain transactions and  
22 solve the “Proof of Work” program are rewarded with newly minted bitcoin. This process is colloquially  
23 referred to as “mining.” Mining is one method by which an individual can acquire cryptocurrencies like  
24 Bitcoin. A second and more common manner is to obtain cryptocurrencies from someone else. This is  
25 often accomplished by acquiring it through an online “cryptocurrency exchange.”

26 27. Online cryptocurrency exchanges are one place to purchase bitcoin and other  
27 cryptocurrencies. These exchanges are similar to traditional exchanges in that they provide a convenient  
28 marketplace to match buyers and sellers of virtual currencies.

1           28.    In April 2013, there were only seven cryptocurrencies listed on coinmarketcap.com, a  
2 popular website that tracks the cryptocurrency markets. As of this filing, the site monitors more than 2,000  
3 cryptocurrencies.

4           29.    Another popular cryptocurrency, Ethereum, was designed to enable “smart contract”  
5 functionality unlike Bitcoin’s blockchain.

6           30.    A smart contract is a program that verifies and enforces the negotiation or performance of  
7 a contract. Smart contracts can be self-executing and self-enforcing, which theoretically reduces the  
8 transaction costs associated with traditional contracting. By way of example of how a smart contract works,  
9 consider a situation where two people want to execute a hedging contract. They each put up \$1,000 worth  
10 of ether. They agree that, after a month, one of them will receive back \$1,000 worth of ether at the dollar  
11 exchange rate at that time, while the other receives the rest of the ether. The rest of the ether may or may  
12 not be worth more than it was at the beginning of the month.

13          31.    A smart contract enables these two people to submit the ether to a secure destination and  
14 automatically distribute the ether at the end of the month without any third-party action. The smart contract  
15 self-executes with instructions written in its code which get executed when the specified conditions are  
16 met.

17          32.    By the end of 2016, interest in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other “alt coins”  
18 began to accelerate, with prices growing at a rate historically unprecedented for any asset class. Over the  
19 course of 2017 alone, bitcoin’s price increased from approximately \$1,000 to approximately \$20,000.  
20 Ethereum’s growth was even more startling. On January 1, 2017, Ethereum was trading at approximately  
21 \$8 per ether. Approximately one year later, it was trading at over \$1,400 per ether – a return of  
22 approximately 17,000 percent over that period.

23          33.    Seeking to capitalize on the growing enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies, many entrepreneurs  
24 sought to raise funds through ICOs.

25          34.    Between 2017 and 2018, nearly \$20 billion was raised through ICOs. None of these ICOs  
26 was registered with the SEC.

1 35. These ICOs were typically announced and promoted through public online channels.  
2 Issuers typically released a “whitepaper” describing the project and terms of the ICO and promoted the sale  
3 of the tokens. They typically advertised the creation of a “new blockchain architecture.”

4 36. The whitepapers contained vastly less information than would have been included in an  
5 SEC registration statement. For example, whitepapers (just like the ICP whitepaper<sup>2</sup>) typically did not  
6 include a “plain English” description of the offering; a list of key risk factors; a description of important  
7 information and incentives concerning management; warnings about relying on forward-looking  
8 statements; an explanation of how the proceeds from the offering would be used; or a standardized format  
9 that investors could readily follow.

10 37. As a result of the lack of information, trading of tokens on exchanges such as Coinbase and  
11 Binance was rife for manipulation.

12 38. For example, the Tezos Foundation had an ICO in 2017, which raised \$232 million for the  
13 company and insiders. This ICO, however, resulted in a class action lawsuit that settled for \$25 million.<sup>3</sup>  
14 Commentators viewed this settlement as a means to avoid a possible future enforcement action by the SEC  
15 for the sale of an unregistered security.<sup>4</sup> According to Quentin Herbrecht, CEO of blockchain marketing  
16 platform Markchain, that the plaintiffs in that action “think that Tezos agreed to settle this fine to prevent  
17 the SEC from re-characterizing their ICO as illegal securities offering, and this could have been a fatal  
18 blow to the project.”<sup>5</sup>

19 39. Similarly, in 2018, Block.One’s held an ICO for the EOS blockchain. After a year-long  
20 offering, Block.One raised a staggering \$4.1 billion for the company and insiders.<sup>6</sup> Shortly after the ICO

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>2</sup> See Dominic Williams, *et al.*, *DFINITY Technology Overview Series Consensus System*, DFINITY  
STIFTUNG (Jan. 23, 2018), <https://dfinity.org/pdf-viewer/pdfs/viewer?file=../library/dfinity-consensus.pdf>.

23 <sup>3</sup> Lucas Cacioli, *Tezos Settles Class-Action Lawsuit Over 2017 \$232 Million ICO to the Tune of \$25*  
24 *Million*, BLOCKCHAIN.NEWS (Sept. 2, 2020), [https://blockchain.news/news/tezos-settles-class-action-](https://blockchain.news/news/tezos-settles-class-action-lawsuit-over-2017-XTZ-232-million-25-million)  
lawsuit-over-2017-XTZ-232-million-25-million.

25 <sup>4</sup> Osato Avan-Nomayo, *Tezos Likely Avoiding SEC Action With \$25M Class-Action Lawsuit*  
26 *Settlement*, COINTELEGRAPH.COM (June 28, 2020), [https://cointelegraph.com/news/tezos-likely-avoiding-](https://cointelegraph.com/news/tezos-likely-avoiding-sec-action-with-25m-class-action-lawsuit-settlement)  
sec-action-with-25m-class-action-lawsuit-settlement.

26 <sup>5</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>6</sup> Brady Dale, *The First Yearlong ICO for EOS Raised \$4 Billion. The Second? Just \$2.8 Million*,  
28 COINDESK.COM (Sept. 17, 2019), [https://www.coindesk.com/the-first-yearlong-ico-for-eos-raised-4-](https://www.coindesk.com/the-first-yearlong-ico-for-eos-raised-4-billion-the-second-just-2-8-million)  
billion-the-second-just-2-8-million.

1 was completed, on September 30, 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) completed an  
2 investigation and found that one Issuer, Block.one, had violated the Securities Act by selling the digital  
3 token EOS, an unregistered security, to the public. As a result of this SEC enforcement action, Block.one  
4 was required to pay a \$24 million fine.<sup>7</sup>

5 40. The founder of another cryptocurrency exchange (Bibox), Aries Wanlin Wang, previously  
6 noted that the secondary market for digital assets can be “rigged by manipulators. If you put major  
7 currencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum aside, many of the tokens you’ll find issued through ICOs are  
8 there to be manipulated.”<sup>8</sup>

9 41. According to Mr. Wang, “[t]hese tokens are similar to penny stocks. And everyone wants  
10 to believe they’ve discovered the next Bitcoin and Ethereum.”<sup>9</sup>

11 42. Mr. Wang also candidly acknowledged that:

12 [t]he problems facing the secondary market in crypto are similar to the problems that were  
13 faced by American stock exchanges 100 years ago. When a market lacks certain  
14 regulations and oversights, predictable things happen. ***Pump and dumps are very common***  
15 ***in the secondary market of cryptocurrency***, just as they were on the US stock exchange  
16 so many years ago. Fraudsters spreading false news about new crypto in a chat room have  
17 a great deal in common with con artists who sent false telegrams with information that  
18 might impact a stock in 1919. In any traditional financial market, the practice of market  
19 manipulation is illegal. And it should be. The lack of regulation that lets some people  
20 make a quick dollar hurts everyone else because it hurts our faith in the system.”

21 [Emphasis added.]

22 43. Notably, Bibox was one of only four cryptocurrency exchanges that have excluded ICP  
23 from trading.

## 24 **B. The Background of ICP**

25 44. Dfinity’s so-called “Internet Computer” project purports to be a decentralized version of the  
26 internet itself. In essence, it is a smart contract platform designed to power blockchain versions of the  
27 internet’s most popular applications – decentralized alternatives to WhatsApp, LinkedIn, eBay, TikTok, etc.

28 <sup>7</sup> Press Release, *SEC Orders Blockchain Company to Pay \$24 Million Penalty for Unregistered ICO*  
(Sept. 30, 2019), <https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-202>; SEC Release No. 10714, 2019 WL  
4793292 (Sept. 30, 2019).

<sup>8</sup> Aries Wanlin Wang, *Crypto Economy: How Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and Token-Economy Are  
Disrupting the Financial World* (2018).

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*



1 – which would displace the need to use centralized, gatekeeping hosting services like Amazon Web  
2 Services.<sup>10</sup>

3 45. The purported native cryptocurrency for Dfinity’s Internet Computer project is the ICP  
4 token. Thus, ICP is both an investment in the Company (as sales are used to fund Company operations with  
5 the expectation that such investments in the Company will increase the value of ICP) and an investment in  
6 itself (with the expectation that the value of ICP will increase), as well as a means of exchange and  
7 governance promoted by Dfinity.

8 46. Unlike cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are mined by computer  
9 hardware validating transactions on their networks, all 469,212, 166.84 ICP tokens in existence were simply  
10 created by Dfinity in May 2021 as a part of the Company’s functional equivalent of an ICO (the “Genesis  
11 Launch”). As discussed more thoroughly below (see supra, Section B) a significant amount of the total ICP  
12 supply was given to Controlling Defendants, with the remaining amount left retained by Dfinity.

13 47. Dfinity’s plan was to publicly offer the ICP tokens it created and retained for sale to retail  
14 investors when the tokens were listed on various cryptocurrency exchanges. Dfinity would then use the  
15 proceeds to fund the Foundation’s operations, including, but not limited to, the Internet Computer Project  
16 or “ICP.”

17 48. Controlling Defendants have financially benefitted from their ICP being merchandized and  
18 enabled the large-scale launch through their connection to the largest cryptocurrency exchanges that made  
19 ICP widely available to the public.

20 49. Defendants have control over how many ICP are in the market.

21 50. No registration statement has been filed for ICP with the SEC and no registration statement  
22 is in effect for ICP.

23  
24  
25  
26  
27 <sup>10</sup> Mike Butcher & Ingrid Lunden, *DFINITY raises \$102M from a16z and Polychain for a*  
28 *decentralized ‘Internet Computer’ to rival AWS*, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 29, 2018),  
<https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/29/dfinity/>.

1           **C. Polychain and Andreessen Horowitz Are Significant Stakeholders of ICP**

2           51. In February 2017, Dfinity held a “Seed” fundraising round for the Company to use for its  
3 operations and investments in projects developed using ICP technology, receiving approximately \$40  
4 million in fiat cash and digital assets “primarily from enthusiasts who followed the project.”<sup>11</sup>

5           52. Dfinity initially promised the “Seed Contributors” that the Company would run a “Main”  
6 fundraising round, akin to an ICO, at which time the seed contributors could cash out.<sup>12</sup>

7           53. “However,” as noted in a May 21, 2021 ICP analyst report, “after the 2017 boom, the project  
8 realized its valuation target was set too low” and the Company believed that “running an ICO fundraiser  
9 could have *placed it in a grey legal territory where securities law was concerned.*”<sup>13</sup>

10          54. Upon information and belief, Polychain and Andreessen were among those initial  
11 “enthusiasts” who were the Seed Contributors to ICP.

12          55. The single “Main” round of Dfinity’s funding model was subsequently changed to a two-  
13 part model. First, Dfinity would hold “Strategic” and “Private Presale” fundraising rounds. Second, Dfinity  
14 would hold what for all intents and purposes was the very same type of ICO-style fundraiser Defendant  
15 Williams claimed might run afoul of securities laws.

16          56. Defendant Williams conceded that Dfinity needed to change the original model because the  
17 Foundation’s initial promise would have capped the Seed Contributors’ returns with a “figure that we later  
18 realized was far too low – *this would hardly satisfy a single large player now*, and it’s clear our years in the  
19 crypto trenches had left us completely unprepared for the explosion in scale of the crypto industry.”<sup>14</sup>

22 <sup>11</sup> Dominic Williams, *Announcing DFINITY Fundraising Plans, and a Massive Welcome to Polychain*  
23 *Capital and Andreessen Horowitz* (Feb. 7, 2018), [https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-](https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3)  
24 [fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3](https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3) (last  
visited May 20, 2021).

25 <sup>12</sup> *See id.*

26 <sup>13</sup> Mira Christanto & Wilson Wthiam, *An Introduction to Dfinity and the Internet Computer* (May 10,  
2021) <https://messari.io/article/an-introduction-to-dfinity-and-the-internet-computer> (emphasis added).

27 <sup>14</sup> Dominic Williams, *Announcing DFINITY Fundraising Plans, and a Massive Welcome to Polychain*  
28 *Capital and Andreessen Horowitz* (Feb. 7, 2018), [https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-](https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3)  
[fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3](https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3) (last  
visited May 20, 2021) (emphasis added).

1           57. In response, Defendant Williams and Dfinity designed this two-part funding model so that it  
2 would “ensure the position of Seed participants will receive 24.72% of the network tokens that will exist at  
3 Genesis . . . however much future funding is now raised.”<sup>15</sup>

4           58. Sometime around January or February 2018, Dfinity ultimately held the “Strategic”  
5 fundraising round.

6           59. Andreessen and Polychain participated in this fundraising round as well, jointly contributing  
7 another \$61 million.<sup>16</sup>

8           60. The “Strategic Round” investors were entitled to receive 7% of the initial supply of ICP  
9 tokens.<sup>17</sup>

10          61. As described in Defendant Williams’ February 7, 2018 blog post “Announcing DFINITY  
11 Fundraising Plans, and a Massive Welcome to Polychain Capital and Andreessen Horowitz”:

12           [Dfinity] also decided that before going any further, we would raise a “Strategic”  
13 fundraising round that would bring in key partners who could help accelerate progress of  
14 our project. Polychain Capital – a successful and now famous crypto hedge fund backed by  
15 Andreessen Horowitz, Sequoia, USV, Founders Fund and many other notable LPs –  
16 contacted us during the summer of 2017, while we were still only an “aficionado’s” project  
17 not many people knew about, and we found we worked extremely well with them. They are  
18 distinguished by bullish optimism about what our industry can achieve balanced by realism  
19 and operational smarts.

20           It was decided that Polychain would lead a relatively small round, and also help establish a  
21 substantial “DFINITY Ecosystem Venture Fund” that will now fund projects building on  
22 the DFINITY Internet Computer or otherwise supporting it. Andreessen Horowitz, one of  
23 Silicon Valley’s preeminent venture capital funds joined the round too, who are also well  
24 known for their forward thinking and the support they provide to investee projects. Today  
25 it was announced that, with the DFINITY Ecosystem Venture Fund, total funding for our  
26 project will exceed \$100M. With this, you can expect DFINITY to begin to emerge from  
27 the dark.

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>15</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>16</sup> See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, *Blockchain project raises \$61 million from Andreessen Horowitz,*  
26 *U.S. hedge fund*, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 7, 2018), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockchain-investment-andreessen/blockchain-project-raises-61-million-from-andreessen-horowitz-u-s-hedge-fund-idUSKBN1FR1IX>.

27 <sup>17</sup> Mira Christanto & Wilson Wthiam, *An Introduction to Dfinity and the Internet Computer* (May 10,  
28 2021) <https://messari.io/article/an-introduction-to-dfinity-and-the-internet-computer> (emphasis added).

62. Later in August 2018, Dfinity held its “Private Presale,” wherein Polychain and Andreessen (among others), contributed \$97 million, which was enough to make them eligible to receive 4.96% of the initial supply of ICP tokens.<sup>18</sup>

63. On August 29, 2018, Defendant Williams (via his blog) announced the successful completion of the Strategic and Private Presale funding round. According to Defendant Williams, this round was led by “returning investors” Andreessen and Polychain, who raised approximately \$111 million in total for Dfinity’s “operations.”<sup>19</sup>

64. Ryan Zurrer, venture partner of Polychain, described the investment in Dfinity as Polychain’s “largest-ever capital deployment.”<sup>20</sup>

65. The following chart from Messari, shows the total token distribution in the Genesis allocation as of May 10, 2021:

	Genesis Initial State Allocations	%	Number of Participants
Early Contributors	44,575,228	9.50%	<50
Seed	115,986,694	24.72%	370
Strategic Partnerships	32,845,140	7.00%	<50
Presale	23,295,828	4.96%	110
Strategic Partnerships	17,795,770	3.79%	<50
Community Airdrop	3,763,448	0.80%	50,000+
Initial Community and Developer	2,242,179	0.48%	<50
Node Operators	1,050,000	0.22%	57
Internet Computer Association	20,000,000	4.26%	1
Team Members	84,480,829	18.00%	200
Advisors and Other Third-parties	11,239,705	2.40%	<50
DFINITY Foundation	111,938,888	23.86%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>469,213,709</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	

Data as of: May 10, 2021  
Source: Dfinity, Messari

66. Notably, 24.72% of available ICP tokens went to “Seed Investors.” Another 23.9% went to the Company itself. 7% and 4.96% went to Strategic and Private Presale Investors, respectively. Thus, in

<sup>18</sup> Mira Christanto & Wilson Wthiam, *An Introduction to Dfinity and the Internet Computer* (May 10, 2021), <https://messari.io/article/an-introduction-to-dfinity-and-the-internet-computer>.

<sup>19</sup> Dominic Williams, *Announcing the Completion of DFINITY’s Presale Round* (Aug. 29, 2018), <https://medium.com/dfinity/dfinitys-presale-round-completed-238da6b42fa1> (last visited May 20, 2021).

<sup>20</sup> See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, *Blockchain project raises \$61 million from Andreessen Horowitz, U.S. hedge fund*, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 7, 2018), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockchain-investment-andreessen/blockchain-project-raises-61-million-from-andreessen-horowitz-u-s-hedge-fund-idUSKBN1FR1IX>.

1 total as much as 60% of the ICP tokens available at the Genesis launch were held by Dfinity and insiders  
2 like the Controlling Defendants.<sup>21</sup>

3 67. Upon information and belief, Polychain and Andreessen together supplied a significant  
4 portion of the capital that Dfinity had received during the Seed, Strategic, and Private Presale fundraising  
5 rounds. In particular, as Seed Contributors, “enthusiasts” like Polychain and Andreessen were likely entitled  
6 to a significant portion of the 24.72% seed contributor allotment of available ICP tokens.

7 68. Polychain and Andreessen’s contribution in the Strategic funding round was at least 50%  
8 higher than their collective contribution to Dfinity during the Seed funding round.

9 69. As significant stakeholders with corporate governance rights provided by their Seed and  
10 Strategic contributor allotments of ICP tokens, Polychain and Andreessen stood to gain a significant amount  
11 if the price of, and interest in, ICP was pumped up as high as possible prior to the token’s listing on open  
12 exchanges.

13 70. As one analyst observed, the token distribution given to early investors like Polychain and  
14 Andreessen “amounts to a windfall for early backers of the Dfinity project . . . who will be able to hold on  
15 to the tokens or sell them on a secondary market”<sup>22</sup> like Coinbase and others.

16 71. In particular, seed investors received the ICP token allotment at a price of \$0.03. Strategic  
17 investors’ allotment price was \$0.62 per token. And Private Presale investors received ICP tokens for \$4.16.  
18 Thus, at the \$731 peak of ICP’s token price on opening day of the Genesis launch – when massive selling  
19 pressure caused the ICP price to drop exponentially – Polychain and Andreessen saw a staggering return on  
20 investment of approximately 2,436,566%, 117,803%, and 17,472% on the seed, strategic, and private  
21 presale investments, respectively.

22 72. Even at the current price of approximately \$36, Polychain and Andreessen’s seed, strategic,  
23 and private presale investments are still up over 119,000%, 5,700%, and 765%, respectively.

26 <sup>21</sup> Mira Christanto & Wilson Wthiam, *An Introduction to Dfinity and the Internet Computer* (May 10,  
27 2021), <https://messari.io/article/an-introduction-to-dfinity-and-the-internet-computer>.

28 <sup>22</sup> Jeff John Roberts, *Exclusive: Dfinity Announces \$35M ‘Air Dro’ for Blockchain-Based Cloud*,  
FORTUNE.COM (May 29, 2018), <https://fortune.com/2018/05/29/blockchain-dfinity-air-drop/>.

1           **D. Defendants Solicit ICP Sales**

2           73. From 2016 to the present, Defendants and their affiliates have been engaged in an ongoing  
3 scheme to promote the Internet Computer project and sell ICP tokens to the general public in order to further  
4 their financial benefits.

5           74. Indeed, Dfinity dedicated an entire section of its website to providing advice on “How to  
6 Access ‘Seed’ and ‘Airdrop ICP Tokens and Participate in the Internet Computer Network.” This section  
7 also stresses that “it is very important that the flow of liquid ICP tokens around the network is released on a  
8 schedule for the safety and security of ICP holders, the network, and its users while the underlying  
9 technology is being fettled and its ecosystem is being established.”

10          75. Defendant Williams initiated a public relations campaign to convince potential investors of  
11 the merits of ICP over others developing blockchain technology projects. Notably, Defendant Williams  
12 repeatedly extolled Dfinity’s virtues and insisted that the Company was not seeking a quick cash grab-style  
13 ICO.

14          76. For example, in an August 2017 blog post, Defendant Williams used the ICO’s of Tezos and  
15 EOS as a foil to Dfinity’s supposedly altruistic approach to fundraising. Defendant Williams suggested that  
16 “those a who have just run ICOs” like Tezos and EOS were just “wishing to earn bounties.”<sup>23</sup>

17          77. Defendant Williams further criticized the Tezos and EOS ICOs, suggesting that those  
18 companies were “chasing ICO money and press coverage” while ICP was putting together a “stellar team  
19 and science first.”<sup>24</sup> Defendant Williams further touted the depth of Dfinity’s “team,” bragging that the  
20 Company had “many more HUGE hires in the pipeline that will rock the tech world. Superstars are now  
21 joining us in droves because of our authentic novel science and the team we already have.”<sup>25</sup>

22          78. In a further effort to distance Dfinity from “unscrupulous projects . . . some whose primary  
23 aim was in fact simply to collect monies from people seeking a quick buck or to launch a dubious token that  
24

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>23</sup> Domenic Williams, *On Accelerating Blockchain Evolution Using Different Funding and Team  
27 Models* (Aug. 25, 2017), [https://medium.com/dfinity/on-accelerating-blockchain-evolution-using-  
28 different-funding-and-team-models-1c04c3d0893a](https://medium.com/dfinity/on-accelerating-blockchain-evolution-using-different-funding-and-team-models-1c04c3d0893a) (last visited May 20, 2021).

27 <sup>24</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>25</sup> *Id.*

1 speculators would send to the moon so that the founders could cash out,” Defendant Williams explained  
2 that:

3         The state of the ICO market creates some challenges for DFINITY. The lack of  
4 discrimination between good and bad projects means there is very poor price discovery  
5 and, if we run a traditional ICO we might also become guilty by association in many eyes.  
6 Furthermore, we fear that a legal and regulatory hornets’ nest has been created, and we  
7 don’t want to have our project – which has an important purpose and involves a  
8 distinguished team of senior researchers and engineers – distracted by legal problems.<sup>26</sup>

9         79. Dfinity announced that it would instead of having a traditional ICO, the Company would  
10 proceed with two funding rounds. The first was a “Presale” round with select investors. And despite  
11 Defendant Williams ardent criticisms against opportunistic ICOs, Dfinity announced it would also have a  
12 second ICO-style round of fundraising from ICP’s public listing on exchanges.

13         80. On February 7, 2018, Defendant Williams personally advised potential investors: “The  
14 second round may or may not happen, and will be termed the ‘ICO,’” which would be “run by regulated  
15 traditional exchanges at the moment the network goes live, setting a new milestone in the sale of utility  
16 tokens powering decentralized networks.” Defendant Williams offered that Dfinity was eager to “begin  
17 preparing our early community for the [ICP] token Presale,” and told potential investors: “If you are  
18 interested in getting involved, stay tuned!”<sup>27</sup>

19         81. Concurrently, Defendant Williams boasted to potential investors: “It will be extraordinarily  
20 easy to build on Dfinity . . . Developers building on the Internet Computer will have super powers. The  
21 word will get around that these guys are building with all these amazing benefits. And uptake will be pretty  
22 rapid once the word gets out.”<sup>28</sup>

23         82. On January 23, 2020, Defendant Williams continued touting ICP’s blockchain technology at  
24 the Davos Summit hosted by the World Economic Forum, arguing that its prototype of an “open” social  
25 network “LinkedUp” was superior to existing social networks like LinkedIn because it would give users a

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26         <sup>26</sup> Dominic Williams, *Announcing DFINITY Fundraising Plans, and a Massive Welcome to Polychain  
27 Capital and Andreessen Horowitz* (Feb. 7, 2018), [https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-  
28 fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3](https://medium.com/dfinity/announcing-dfinity-fundraising-plans-and-a-massive-welcome-to-polychain-capital-and-andreessen-2ceb34769cd3) (last  
visited May 20, 2021).

27         <sup>27</sup> Mo Marshall, *Dfinity raises \$61 million for blockchain-based cloud*, VENTUREBEAT.COM (Feb. 7,  
2018), <https://venturebeat.com/2018/02/07/dfinity-raises-61-million-for-blockchain-based-cloud/>.

28         <sup>28</sup> *Id.*

1 “deeper understanding of how the proprietary algorithms work” and make them “more empowered to fight  
2 against monopolistic trends in the existing internet infrastructure.”<sup>29</sup>

3 83. On June 25, 2020, the official Dfinity twitter account issued a tweet that stated that “Billions  
4 of dollars are waiting to invest in the open web” and highlighted an event with Polychain founder Olaf  
5 Carlson-Wee.

6 84. On July 9, 2020, Dfinity published an article on Medium.com authored by Polychain founder  
7 Olaf Carlson-Wee entitled “Investing in the Open Web: A New Thesis.” In this article, Carlson-Wee, on  
8 behalf of Dfinity, promoted investment in the Internet Computer and highlighted investors’ expectations of  
9 profit. The article stated that “Financial backers see tremendous upside in the open web’s ability to create  
10 financial opportunities for innovation that previously didn’t exist.” The article further stated that “venture  
11 capitalists with billions in assets under management are eyeing decentralized infrastructure that will make  
12 it easier for developers to innovate and scale-out their internet services to billions of users” and that “VCs  
13 are eager to deploy billions in capital to foster the decentralized web[.]”

14 85. On February 18, 2021, Dfinity held a virtual event in conjunction with Forbes called “Trillion  
15 Dollar Opportunity: How a New Internet Will Completely Reimagine Your Business Model.”<sup>30</sup> The event  
16 “convened top investors and entrepreneurs” to discuss “how businesses can seize this opportunity to reset,  
17 rethink and reinvest in how they interact with the internet[.]”

18 86. Leading up to the Genesis launch, and in the days following its opening, Defendants  
19 relentlessly marketed ICP in an effort to ensure ICP’s favorable listing on the various exchanges, which, in  
20 turn, would serve to inflate ICP’s opening price. Part of this strategy was to have Defendant Williams launch  
21 a press tour continued to promote ICP.

22 87. Defendant Williams went on a press tour to solicit investment in the Internet Computer and  
23 ICP tokens. For example, in a May 7, 2021 interview Defendant Williams ahead of the ICP launch,  
24 Defendant Williams proclaimed ICP will be “humanity’s primary compute platform for building software”  
25

26 <sup>29</sup> Michael Nunez, *This Startup Thinks Blockchain Is The Only Thing That Can Save Social Media*,  
27 FORBES.COM (Jan. 23, 2020), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnunez/2020/01/23/this-startup-thinks-blockchain-is-the-only-thing-that-can-save-social-media/?sh=250f85ec5097>.

28 <sup>30</sup> See <https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinnovationteam/2021/01/20/trillion-dollar-opportunity-how-a-new-internet-will-completely-reimagine-your-business-model/?sh=7292d9d361d8>.



1 in 20 years.<sup>31</sup> During the same Genesis Launch event that Williams made these statements, Dfinity  
2 employee Liz Yang (who is based in the San Francisco Bay Area) advised investors that they could “begin  
3 acquiring the ICP utility token through approved channels such as exchanges very soon.” Dfinity employee  
4 Michael Hunte (also based in the San Francisco Bay Area) described the launch of Dfinity network as “the  
5 dawn of the new open and free internet.”

6 88. On May 8, 2021, in an live-streamed interview with Bloomberg, Defendants Williams  
7 boasted how on ICP “you can build things on a blockchain now that [ ] never would have been possible.”<sup>32</sup>  
8 Defendant Williams further suggested that ICP users could create disruptive social media networks that  
9 could displace rivals like Facebook and innovate “tokenized social media.”<sup>33</sup>

10 89. Williams likewise told Business Insider that mainstream venture capital firms are sitting on  
11 “billions and billion of dollars” that they’re ready to invest in crypto and so-called “open internet” startups.<sup>34</sup>

12 90. On May 10, 2021, ICP was listed on multiple cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase,  
13 Binance, Huobi, OKEx and others. By way of the internet, including Dfinity’ website, Defendant  
14 Williams’s blog, Twitter, and the over 25 cryptocurrency exchanges that trade ICP, interstate means are  
15 used in connection with the offer and sale of ICP.

16 91. Through Defendant Williams’ bombastic solicitations, and the out of nowhere top-10 debut  
17 that was enabled by the Controlling Defendants, ICP capitalized on investors’ “fear of missing out” on the  
18 next big thing.

19  
20 <sup>31</sup> Ariana Hamacher, *Get Set For ‘a Wild Ride’: Dfinity’s Dom Williams on the Launch of the Internet  
Computer* (May 7, 2021), <https://decrypt.co/70175/get-set-for-a-wild-ride-dfinitys-dom-williams-on-the-launch-of-the-internet-computer>.

21 <sup>32</sup> *Internet Computer Works Differently Than Any Other Blockchain: Dominic Williams*,  
22 BLOOMBERG.COM (May 8, 2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2021-05-08/internet-computer-works-differently-than-any-other-blockchain-dominic-williams-video>; *see also* Nicolas  
23 Pongratz, *Internet Computer (ICP) Market Value Reaches \$45B Two Days after Launch*, YAHOO!FINANCE  
24 (May 12, 2021), <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/internet-computer-icp-market-value-110516675.html?guccounter=1>.

25 <sup>33</sup> *Internet Computer Works Differently Than Any Other Blockchain: Dominic Williams*,  
26 BLOOMBERG.COM (May 8, 2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2021-05-08/internet-computer-works-differently-than-any-other-blockchain-dominic-williams-video>.

27 <sup>34</sup> Shalini Nagarajan, *Internet Computer is already one of the top 10 cryptocurrencies with a market  
28 cap of \$45 billion – just two days after launching*, Markets Insider (May 12, 2021),  
<https://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/news/internet-computer-dfinity-top-digital-assets-market-cap-dominic-williams-2021-5>

1 92. Despite having less than \$200 million total from its Seed and Strategic fundraising rounds as  
2 capital and being relatively unknown at its debut (notwithstanding Controlling Defendants marketing  
3 efforts), ICP catapulted to the eighth largest token in terms of market capitalization.<sup>35</sup>

4 93. ICP debuted at a price of \$731 on its first day and its valuation rose to more than \$45 billion.<sup>36</sup>

5 94. Immediately after being listed on the most popular exchanges, however, ICP's price  
6 plummeted. As reported on the crypto-related online forum, Coinspeaker.com:

7 Internet Computer (ICP) made a debut with an incredible display of \$45 billion market  
8 value. However, the moment was short-lived as the price took a nosedive from \$731 debut  
price to \$146 within a few minutes.<sup>37</sup>

9 95. As crypto journalist, Samuel Wan, observed in a NewsBTC article, *Internet Computer (ICP)*  
10 *Drops From Nowhere to Storm The Top Ten*, "it's not often that a relatively unknown token enters the top  
11 10. This has many wondering if ICP is a legit project."<sup>38</sup>

12 96. Wen further reported that "ICP enter[ed] the top ten on CoinMarketCap following its  
13 exchange debut. ICP was sitting as high as the fourth spot, but following heavy sell pressure, it's since  
14 dropped to the seventh position. . . ."<sup>39</sup>

15 97. The price of ICP continued to drop in the following weeks. Throughout this time, however,  
16 Defendants continued to promote the ICP and its potential for success.

17 98. On May 12, 2021, Defendant Williams repeated the claim that ICP was the "third major  
18 innovation in blockchain," following Bitcoin and Ethereum.<sup>40</sup>

21 <sup>35</sup> Brenden Rearick, *Internet Computer (ICP) Crypto: 10 Things to Know as ICP Snags No. 8 Spot*,  
22 INVESTORPLACE.COM (May 12, 2021), <https://investorplace.com/2021/05/internet-computer-icp-crypto-10-things-to-know-as-icp-snags-no-8-spot/>.

23 <sup>36</sup> Matthew Leising and Olga Kharif, *Overnight Crypto Sensation Sets Out to Undo Internet's*  
24 *Failings*.BLOOMBERG.COM (May 12, 2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-12/crypto-s-overnight-sensation-is-taking-on-the-web-as-we-know-it>.

25 <sup>37</sup> <https://www.coinspeaker.com/internet-computer-falls-price-endorphin/>.

26 <sup>38</sup> <https://www.newsbtc.com/news/internet-computer-icp-drops-from-nowhere-to-storm-the-top-ten/>.

27 <sup>39</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>40</sup> Brenden Rearick, *Internet Computer (ICP) Crypto: 10 Things to Know as ICP Snags No. 8 Spot*,  
INVESTORPLACE.COM (May 12, 2021), <https://investorplace.com/2021/05/internet-computer-icp-crypto-10-things-to-know-as-icp-snags-no-8-spot/>.

1           99.     That same day, the founder of Polychain, Olaf Carlson-Wee, echoed that statement in an  
2 interview with Bloomberg: “Dfinity is the most important technology launched since Ethereum.”<sup>41</sup> Carlson-  
3 Wee even personally endorsed Dfinity’s prospects of displacing Ethereum, saying “People like me in the  
4 crypto world recognize the magnitude of the technology breakthroughs Dfinity represents. . . . Even with  
5 the changes Ethereum is going through to improve its speed and performance it won’t be able to compete  
6 with what the Internet Computer will enable . . . Dfinity will enable novel types of apps that aren’t possible  
7 to build on any other blockchain.”<sup>42</sup>

8           100.    Simultaneously, Defendants leveraged their relationships with various exchanges to further  
9 boost sales of ICP.

10          101.    For example, besides being a large investor in ICP, Andreessen also happens to be the biggest  
11 outside investor in one of the largest crypto exchanges, Coinbase. Andreessen’s stake in Coinbase is worth  
12 approximately \$9.7 billion.<sup>43</sup>

13          102.    Furthermore, according to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Marc  
14 Andreessen personally owns 5,516,037 Class A shares and 23,961,498 Class B shares of Coinbase stock  
15 and is the largest individual shareholder behind Coinbase’s CEO and co-founder Brian Armstrong.

16          103.    Andreessen’s co-founders and general partners, Marc Andreessen and Kathryn Haun also  
17 both serve as members of Coinbase’s board of directors.<sup>44</sup>

18          104.    Andreessen used its relationship with Coinbase to secure a favorable listing and price of ICP  
19 during its debut on Coinbase.

20          105.    Indeed, Coinbase’s opening listing price for ICP was one of the highest of all crypto  
21 exchanges participating in ICP’s Genesis event.

24 <sup>41</sup> Matthew Leising and Olga Kharif, *Overnight Crypto Sensation Sets Out to Undo Internet’s*  
25 *Failings*.BLOOMBERG.COM (May 12, 2021), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-12/crypto-s-overnight-sensation-is-taking-on-the-web-as-we-know-it>.

26 <sup>42</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>43</sup> Ari Levy, *Here’s who just got rich from the Coinbase debut*, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2021),  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/14/coinbase-who-gets-rich.html>.

28 <sup>44</sup> <https://investor.coinbase.com/governance/board-of-directors/default.aspx>.

1 106. Crypto analysts covering ICP noted that, compared to other decentralized ecosystem projects  
2 like Polkadot and Terra, it appeared that “ICP is priced above peers.”<sup>45</sup>

3 107. Additionally, as crypto journalist Samuel Wen observed: “The sudden appearance of ICP in  
4 the top ten has caused a stir in that ICP has achieved a lot in a relatively short time. For example, ICP is  
5 already listed on Coinbase Pro, whereas ADA, which has been around since late 2017, only achieved this in  
6 March this year.”<sup>46</sup>

7 108. Another example of Dfinity having leverage to gain a favorable listing price can be seen  
8 between Dfinity and the cryptocurrency and derivatives exchange OKEx. On May 12, 2021, OKEx  
9 announced the public listing of ICP on the exchange. That same announcement also disclosed that Dfinity  
10 had previously agreed to help collaborate and fund OKEx’s “Blockdream Ventures fund,” jointly providing  
11 \$10 million in special funding.<sup>47</sup> OPEX Chief Executive Officer, Jay Hao, personally endorsed the ICP’s  
12 public listing in the announcement:

13 We are pleased to support the launch of the Internet Computer as a Day 1 partner and be a  
14 part of this global movement to reinvent the internet as we gradually move toward a  
15 decentralized future. We hope that this will be the first big step in allowing entrepreneurs,  
16 developers or enterprises to host secure software systems built on top of computer science,  
17 and really just backing the long-term evolution of the internet.<sup>48</sup>

18 109. Defendant Williams was quoted in the OPEX press release stated, in a press release for the  
19 listing of ICP on the OKEx exchange, that “The Internet Computer represents the third major innovation in  
20 blockchain after Bitcoin and Ethereum. . . . It represents the product of an unprecedented multi-year R&D  
21 effort, orchestrated by the DFINITY Foundation from research and development centers in Zurich, Palo  
22 Alto, San Francisco and Tokyo.”<sup>49</sup>

23 <sup>45</sup> Mira Christanto & Wilson Wthiam, *An Introduction to Dfinity and the Internet Computer* (May 10,  
24 2021), <https://messari.io/article/an-introduction-to-dfinity-and-the-internet-computer>.

25 <sup>46</sup> <https://www.newsbtc.com/news/internet-computer-icp-drops-from-nowhere-to-storm-the-top-ten/>.

26 <sup>47</sup> Press Release, *OKE Lists DFINITY’s Internet Computer Token, ICP* (May 12, 2021),  
<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/okex-lists-dfinitys-internet-computer-token-icp-301290037.html>.

27 <sup>48</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>49</sup> *Id.*

1 110. These efforts were not enough to stem the increasing losses as ICP’s token price continued  
2 to fall since its debut. In response, Defendant Williams made another announcement this time about a new  
3 program being launched by Dfinity: “Endorphin.”

4 111. On May 14, 2021, Defendant Williams and Dfinity announced the Company’s plan for  
5 Endorphin, a decentralized operating system for phones, laptops, and other user devices.<sup>50</sup> Defendant  
6 Williams claimed that Dfinity was “looking for ways to accelerate the program, and I’m hopeful  
7 announcement will be made shortly.” The message that some analysts in the cryptocurrency sector received  
8 was that the launch of Endorphin would “create huge demand which will in response have an impact on the  
9 price of ICP.”<sup>51</sup>

10 112. This announcement, however, did not have the desired effect. As of May 16, 2021, ICP had  
11 lost 60% of its debut price and was valued at only \$32 billion.<sup>52</sup>

12 113. On May 17, 2021, the Coinspeaker website reported that “[d]espite the coin’s price falling  
13 from its debut price of \$731 to \$258 over the past weekend, the networks digital currency has continued to  
14 nosedive. . . . At the time of writing, Internet Computer is trading at a price of \$209.15, down 16.43% in  
15 the past 24 hours and by 70% from its all-time high (ATH) of \$737.20 according to CoinMarketCap.”<sup>53</sup>

16 114. The report noted that ICP holders had “enjoyed a robust and well-acclaimed debut,” but that  
17 they are now looking towards “disruptive use cases to bounce back to its winning ways.”<sup>54</sup>

18 115. As of May 22, 2021, the price of ICP had crated to \$134 a token.

19 116. As noted in a May 22, 2021 video by the popular cryptococurrency YouTube channel, Coin  
20 Bureau, the current drop in ICP’s price chart “looks more in line [a] downward price trend, which I believe  
21

22 <sup>50</sup> Dominic Williams, *Plans for “Endorphin,” a Free and Open Crypto OS for Smartphones and*  
23 *Other End-User Devices* (May 14, 2021), <https://medium.com/dfinity/plans-for-endorphin-a-free-and-open-crypto-os-for-smartphones-and-other-end-user-devices-9ebb763a711e>.

24 <sup>51</sup> John K. Kumi, *Internet Computer (ICP) Falls Heavily from Debut Price Despite Dfinity’s Plans to*  
25 *Launch Endorphin* (May 16, 2021), <https://www.coinspeaker.com/internet-computer-falls-price-endorphin/>.

26 <sup>52</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>53</sup> Benjamin Godfrey, *Dfinity’s Internet Computer (ICP) Continues on Its Price Decline amid*  
*Ongoing Market Correction* (May 17, 2021), <https://www.coinspeaker.com/internet-computer-icp-correction/>.

28 <sup>54</sup> *Id.*

1 will continue for some time. This is because there seems to be much more sell pressure than buy pressure  
2 for the ICP token.”<sup>55</sup>

3 117. As Linda Kreitzman, Assistant Dean at University of California at Berkley’s Haas School of  
4 Business who helps oversee the Berkeley Haas Blockchain Initiative noted, the “timing” of ICP’s listing  
5 and its “cool” name “created the perfect situation for an explosive debut” for the Dfinity’s ownership  
6 token.<sup>56</sup>

7 118. Defendants took advantage of this carefully timed ICO to sell their ICP holdings both when  
8 the cryptocurrency market was generally reaching all-time highs amidst the 2021 “crypto bull run” and when  
9 the ICP tokens, in particular, were exponentially inflated during the debut. The ICO also was also conducted  
10 shortly after Coinbase’s Direct Listing, which brought Coinbase shares to the NASDAQ stock exchange.

11 119. On June 14, 2021, Defendant Williams posted a thread on the Dfinity’s page on Reddit titled  
12 “An ICP Tokenomics NNS Proposal is in the works – Dominic Williams,” which made the following  
13 admission:

14 It is arguably the case that many ECT/Seed holders don’t care much about the fair price for  
15 ICP because they have achieved extraordinary gains. Even at \$60, they are still 1800X up.  
16 Of course, experience crypto holders want to maximize their gains . . . . ***[T]here has been***  
17 ***a lot of sell volume so far, mainly from ECT/Seed and ex and early employees and***  
***affiliates that lucked out.*** The latter group will exhaust their reserved rather quickly [in  
my opinion] which will be no bad thing. ***ECT/Seed not so quickly.*** With healthier future  
volumes and demand, that should not be an issue, but anyway . . . .

18 I am working on a tokenomics proposal to address the situation, which I’m hoping will be  
19 proposed to the NNS in about 2-3 weeks. The IC is fully adaptive, and that means that it  
20 can constantly improve the protocol *and* the tokenomics. ***Advanced cryptoeconomics can***  
***be used to weaken the “prisoner’s dilemma” dynamic that has arisen.***<sup>57</sup>

21 120. On June 28, 2021, Arkham Intelligence released a report on the “Internet Computer Token”  
22 (the “Arkham Report”).<sup>58</sup> Summing up the ICP story to that point, the Arkham Report stated:

23 <sup>55</sup> *Internet Computer (ICP): BIGGEST Launch of 2021??*, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGrFj3pav\\_A](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGrFj3pav_A).

24 <sup>56</sup> Danielle Abril, *What is Internet Computer? A guide to the latest buzzy cryptocurrency* (May 12,  
25 2021), <https://fortune.com/2021/05/12/what-is-internet-computer-cryptocurrency-digital-currency/#:~:text=Dfinity%20is%20backed%20by%20investors,Aspect%20Ventures%2C%20and%20Eterna%20Capital>.

26 <sup>57</sup> See [https://www.reddit.com/r/dfinity/comments/nz715r/an\\_icp\\_tokenomics\\_nns\\_proposal\\_is\\_in\\_the\\_works/](https://www.reddit.com/r/dfinity/comments/nz715r/an_icp_tokenomics_nns_proposal_is_in_the_works/) (emphasis added).

27 <sup>58</sup> <https://arkhamintelligence.com/icp/report.pdf>.

1 As of this writing, the Internet Computer token (ICP) has lost 95% of its value from its  
2 launch event in May, dropping from \$730 to \$30, and wiping out over \$300 billion dollars  
3 of value based on ICP's total supply. These are astounding numbers in the crypto world  
4 and financial world overall, even with the current market's volatile prices and soaring  
5 valuations. At its peak, ICP was the third most valuable crypto-asset, behind Bitcoin and  
6 Ethereum, and was worth as much by market cap as Mastercard, Bank of America, and  
7 PayPal. In its first month ICP's price decreased more than any other top 100 token by a  
8 good margin. Altogether retail investors who bought ICP on Coinbase or other major crypto  
9 exchanges have lost millions if not billions of dollars.

10 121. The Arkham Report found that the Dfinity Treasury and project insiders deposited billions  
11 of dollars' worth of ICP to exchanges at the time of the Genesis listing and the following weeks. By  
12 analyzing the transactions made by various exchanges, the Arkham Report notes that deposits made by the  
13 Dfinity Treasury provided initial liquidity on exchanges. In addition to the Dfinity Treasury itself, the  
14 Arkham Report found that the Dfinity Treasury also sent 34.1 million ICP tokens to 34 suspected insider  
15 addresses. These addresses have deposited 10.7 million ICP tokens to exchanges (very likely for sale)  
16 during the Genesis listing and intermittently in the weeks following the Genesis listing. The Arkham Report  
17 identified a fundamental pattern of activity of many suspected insiders: a large transfer from the Treasury  
18 before listing day, followed by intermittent exchange deposits post-listing. These transfers were very likely  
19 for sale and the exceptional decrease in the price of ICP since its listing is indicative of massive selling.

20 122. In addition, the Arkham Report found that Dfinity did not follow industry practices meant to  
21 demonstrate good faith and assure investors that project insiders would not trigger a price collapse through  
22 massive selling. The Arkham Report called into question the lack of transparency from Dfinity on Token  
23 Allocation and unlocking schedules, and determined, based on a review of Dfinity's public materials, there  
24 was no widely distributed public statement that included the allocation and unlocking schedules.

25 123. Indeed, there was no clear and detailed breakdown of token allocation and unlocking  
26 schedules, only the total supply of tokens and different categories of holders. By failing to provide such  
27 critical information, retail investors were caught in a "rug pull," a "team dump" or a "VC dump" as  
28 Defendants collapsed the ICP price by offloading large amounts of ICP tokens.

1           **E. Investors Would Not Reasonably Have Understood that ICP Tokens Were**  
2           **Securities**

3           124. In connection with the Genesis launch, Dfinity and Defendant Williams made  
4 statements that reasonably led Plaintiffs and Class members to conclude that the ICP tokens were not  
5 securities.

6           125. As a threshold matter, Dfinity refused to register ICP tokens with the SEC, which  
7 indicated to investors that these were not securities. No such valid exemption from registration  
8 requirements exists for ICP.

9           126. Additionally, Dfinity repeatedly asserted that ICP tokens were “utility tokens,” rather  
10 than “security tokens” (which would be securities that would have to be registered with the SEC). For  
11 example, in a May 6, 2021 blog post titled “Understanding the Internet Computer’s Network Nervous  
12 System, Neurons, and ICP Utility Tokens” – as the names indicates – refers to ICP as “native utility  
13 tokens.”<sup>59</sup>

14           127. Similarly, another Dfinity blog post four days later echoes the statement that “ICP are  
15 native utility tokens.”<sup>60</sup>

16           128. That same day, May 10, 2021, Dfinity published a second blog post titled “How to  
17 Access ‘Seed’ and ‘Airdrop’ ICP Tokens and Participate in the Internet Computer Network,” which  
18 again referred to ICP as “utility tokens.”<sup>61</sup>

19           129. Defendants also misleadingly compared ICP to Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are  
20 commodities. Defendant Williams, for example, wrote in August 2020 that the Internet Computer “fits”  
21 on a “continuum” that included Bitcoin and Ethereum.<sup>62</sup> In particular, Williams stated the following:

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>59</sup> [https://medium.com/dfinity/understanding-the-internet-computers-network-nervous-system-  
neurons-and-icp-utility-tokens-730dab65cae8](https://medium.com/dfinity/understanding-the-internet-computers-network-nervous-system-neurons-and-icp-utility-tokens-730dab65cae8).

24 <sup>60</sup> Dfinity, *Getting Started Using the ICP Wallet and Network Nervous System Dapp on the Internet*  
25 *Computer* (May 10, 2021), [https://medium.com/dfinity/getting-started-on-the-internet-computers-  
network-nervous-system-app-wallet-61ecf111ea11](https://medium.com/dfinity/getting-started-on-the-internet-computers-network-nervous-system-app-wallet-61ecf111ea11).

26 <sup>61</sup> Dfinity, *How to Access ‘Seed’ and ‘Airdrop’ ICP Tokens and Participate in the Internet Computer*  
27 *Network* (May 10, 2021), [https://medium.com/dfinity/how-to-access-seed-and-airdrop-icp-tokens-and-  
participate-in-the-internet-computer-network-e6cd663a0c3c](https://medium.com/dfinity/how-to-access-seed-and-airdrop-icp-tokens-and-participate-in-the-internet-computer-network-e6cd663a0c3c).

28 <sup>62</sup> [https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-  
network-afc513bf15e1](https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-network-afc513bf15e1).



1 On this spectrum is Bitcoin, which is a pure cryptocurrency designed as a digital gold,  
2 through Ethereum, which is a highly programmable cryptocurrency capable of supporting  
3 sophisticated DeFi, through to the Internet Computer, which can run mainstream enterprise  
4 systems and hyperscale internet services. All three are blockchains, but they provide  
5 different things.

6 130. In that same blog, Defendant Williams further stated that the Internet Computer’s software  
7 canisters were “tamperproof just like Ethereum smart contracts.”<sup>63</sup>

8 131. In an October 7, 2020 blog post “A Closer Look at Software Canisters, an Evolution of  
9 Smart Contract,” the Foundation stated software canisters were a “key concept” for ICP, and noted how,  
10 among other things, an Ethereum developer may associate these canisters with smart contracts.<sup>64</sup> Dfinity  
11 went on to endorse this comparison as “correct.”

12 132. At the time of the Genesis launch, Dfinity took advantage of the market’s lack of  
13 understanding and awareness concerning how this particular investment contract worked. In the face of  
14 promises that ICP would be similar to Bitcoin and Ethereum, and considering the new technology at issue  
15 and Dfinity’s other statements, many investors were understandably unaware that ICP tokens had  
16 fundamentally different features than other cryptocurrencies, which the SEC has determined are not  
17 securities.<sup>65</sup>

18 133. Moreover, the Internet Computer project was advertised as being an improvement on  
19 Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies. For example, on August 28, 2020, Defendant Williams  
20 published an article on the Dfinity blog titled “How Ethereum Could Be Supercharged by the Internet  
21 Computer Network” that made several statements proclaiming the benefits of ICP over “traditional  
22 blockchains.”<sup>66</sup> In particular, Williams offered that:

23 The Internet Computer works differently than traditional blockchains, and this enables  
24 Ethereum developers to incorporate its capabilities into their dapps with relative ease. For

25 <sup>63</sup> [https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-  
26 network-afc513bf15e1](https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-network-afc513bf15e1).

27 <sup>64</sup> Dfinity, *A Closer Look at Software Canisters, an Evolution of Smart Contract* (October 7, 2020),  
28 [https://medium.com/dfinity/software-canisters-an-evolution-of-smart-contracts-internet-computer-  
f1f92f1bfff](https://medium.com/dfinity/software-canisters-an-evolution-of-smart-contracts-internet-computer-f1f92f1bfff).

<sup>65</sup> Note – there is some statement of policy on the Ethereum which noted that the ICO was problematic,  
but noted it was long after any SOL had run out.

<sup>66</sup> Dominic Williams, *How Ethereum Could Be Supercharged by the Internet Computer Network*  
(August 28, 2020), [https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-  
computer-network-afc513bf15e1](https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-network-afc513bf15e1).

1 example, whereas Ethereum requires users to submit some amount of ETH with every  
2 transaction to pay for the gas that fuels the computation resulting from smart contract code  
3 being invoked, on the Internet Computer canisters (a form of smart contracts) are pre-  
4 charged with “cycles” (the equivalent of gas) and pay for computation themselves.<sup>67</sup>

5 134. Defendant Williams further touted advantages of the Internet Computer over Ethereum:

6 a) “Ethereum dapps can use [ICP’s] software canisters to expand their capabilities in a  
7 multitude of exciting ways, including scaling data storage and processing, and serving Web  
8 experiences.”

9 b) “To store 1GB of data inside a smart contract on the Ethereum network would cost  
10 millions of dollars, which can make it prohibitively expensive to maintain anything beyond fiduciary  
11 data. By contrast, the cost of storing 1GB of data inside a canister on the Internet Computer over  
12 some substantial period of time can cost as little as a few cents, providing an incredible solution for  
13 Ethereum dapps that need to maintain and process large data sets.”; and

14 c) “The Internet Computer’s protocols also apply far more advanced cryptography and  
15 computer science [than Ethereum], making it more difficult for community developers to drive R&D  
16 alone. . . .”<sup>68</sup>

17 135. In addition to claiming ICP’s technical superiority over other cryptocurrencies, Dfinity also  
18 indicated that it would benefit financially and use the funds raised through Genesis launch to continue to  
19 enhance the ICP software and support the growth of the project.

20 136. At the time of the Genesis launch, Defendants took advantage of the market’s lack of  
21 understanding and awareness concerning how this investment contract worked. With promises that ICP  
22 would be better than other cryptocurrencies like Ethereum, many individuals were unaware that ICP tokens  
23 had fundamentally different features than other cryptocurrencies, including being more centralized than  
24 Bitcoin or Ethereum. One of these primary differences is that all ICP tokens were issued by the Foundation  
25 at creation at very little economic cost – and enormous potential upside – to Defendants.

26 137. The creation of ICP tokens at the direction of Dfinity occurred through a centralized process,  
27 in contrast to Bitcoin and Ethereum. This would not have been apparent at issuance, however, to a

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27 <sup>67</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>68</sup> *Id.*

1 reasonable investor. Rather, it was only after the passage of time and disclosure of additional information  
2 about the issuer’s intent, process of management, and success in allowing decentralization to arise that a  
3 reasonable purchaser could know that he or she had acquired a security. Purchasers were thereby misled  
4 into believing that ICP was something other than a security, when it was a security.

5 138. Accordingly, it was not apparent to a reasonable investor, at issuance, that the ICP tokens  
6 were securities under the law, and a reasonable investor would not have believed they were securities.

7 **F. ICP Is a Security**

8 139. Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, a “security” is defined to include an “investment  
9 contract.” 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(1). An investment contract is “an investment of money in a common  
10 enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” *S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293,  
11 301 (1946). Specifically, a transaction qualifies as an investment contract and, thus, a security if it is: (1) an  
12 investment; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with a reasonable expectation of profits; and (4) to be derived  
13 from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. *See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*,  
14 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975). This definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static principle, one that is  
15 capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the  
16 money of others on the promise of profits,” and thereby “permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of  
17 compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of instruments that in our  
18 commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’” *W.J. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. at 299.  
19 Accordingly, in analyzing whether something is a security, “form should be disregarded for substance,” and  
20 the emphasis should be “on economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended  
21 thereto.” *Forman*, 421 U.S. at 849.

22 140. Investors who bought ICP tokens invested money or other valuable consideration, in a  
23 common enterprise: namely Dfinity. Investors had a reasonable expectation of profit based upon the efforts  
24 of the Defendants, including, among other things, Defendant obtaining favorable listings of their ICP  
25 tokens on cryptocurrency exchanges such as Coinbase and Binance.

26 **1. ICP Investors Invested Money**

27 141. Plaintiff and the Class invested fiat, including U.S. dollars, and digital currencies, such as  
28 Bitcoin and Ethereum, to purchase ICP tokens.

1 142. The ICP tokens were listed on cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase and Binance, which  
2 allowed retail investors to purchase ICP tokens with traditional and other digital currencies.

3 143. Defendants sold ICP tokens to the general public through global, online cryptocurrency  
4 exchanges during its so-called “Genesis” listing. ICP can be bought or sold on over 25 exchanges.

5 144. Every purchase of ICP by a member of the public is an investment contract.

6 **2. ICP Investors Were Intertwined in a Common Enterprise with Defendants**

7 145. Additionally, investors were passive participants in the ICP tokens’ Genesis launch and the  
8 profits of each Plaintiff and the Class were intertwined with those of Defendants and of other investors.  
9 Dfinity concedes that it uses ICP to fund its operations and promote projects on the Internet Computer,  
10 even criticizing other blockchain technology developers for not using their proceeds from previous  
11 ICOs to hire more quantity and quality employees.<sup>69</sup>

12 146. Defendants also were responsible for supporting the ICP tokens, pooled investors’ assets,  
13 and controlled those assets.

14 147. Further, Defendants hold a significant stake in the ICP tokens, and thus shared in the profits  
15 and risk of the project.

16 148. For example, Defendant Williams himself explained the objectives of Dfinity’s investing  
17 rounds and Genesis launch was to fund the Dfinity Foundations operations and investments.

18 **3. Investors Purchased the ICP Tokens with a Reasonable Expectation of Profit**  
19 **from Owning Them**

20 149. Investors in the ICP tokens, including Plaintiffs and the Class, made their investment with  
21 a reasonable expectation of profits. The ICP tokens were sold to investors prior to a network or  
22 “ecosystem” being fully developed on which they could be used. For pre-functional tokens, such as the  
23 ICP tokens, the primary purpose for purchasing ICP tokens was to make a profit or secure governance  
24 rights, rather than to utilize the ICP tokens themselves for a task.

25  
26  
27 <sup>69</sup> Domenic Williams, *On Accelerating Blockchain Evolution Using Different Funding and Team*  
28 *Models* (Aug. 25, 2017), <https://medium.com/dfinity/on-accelerating-blockchain-evolution-using-different-funding-and-team-models-1c04c3d0893a> (last visited May 20, 2021).

1                   **4. Investors Expected Profits from the ICP Tokens to Be Derived from the**  
2                   **Managerial Efforts of Defendants**

3                   150. Investors’ profits in the ICP tokens were to be derived from the managerial efforts of others  
4 – specifically the Foundation, the Company, and Defendant Williams. ICP investors relied on the  
5 managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of the Foundation, and its executive and development teams (which  
6 included Defendant Williams) to manage, oversee, and/or develop the projects funded by the Genesis  
7 launch.

8                   151. Purchasers of pre-functional tokens necessarily rely on the managerial efforts of others to  
9 realize value from their Investments. The success of these managerial efforts in developing the networks  
10 on which these tokens will operate is the primary factor in their price, that is, until such tokens transition  
11 into being functional utility tokens.

12                   152. Each of the ICP tokens was a security at issuance because profit from the ICP tokens would  
13 be derived primarily from the managerial efforts of Dfinity’s teams developing the associated networks on  
14 which the ICP tokens would function, rather than having their profit derived from market forces of supply  
15 and demand, such as might affect the price of a commodity such as gold (or Bitcoin).

16                   153. Investors in ICP relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of Dfinity and its  
17 executive and development team to manage and develop the NNS system and Internet Computer Project.

18                   154. Dfinity’s executive teams typically held themselves out to investors as experts in the  
19 blockchain and crypto field. Investors in the ICP tokens reasonably expected the Dfinity’ development  
20 teams to provide significant managerial efforts after the ICP tokens’ launch.

21                   155. For example, Defendant Williams boisterously touted the “superstars” that would “rock the  
22 world” whom Dfinity was able to recruit to the “stellar team” working on the Internet Computer project.<sup>70</sup>  
23 Dfinity praised that team as being integral to the success of Internet Computer project.

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26  
27 <sup>70</sup> Domenic Williams, *On Accelerating Blockchain Evolution Using Different Funding and Team*  
28 *Models* (Aug. 25, 2017), <https://medium.com/dfinity/on-accelerating-blockchain-evolution-using-different-funding-and-team-models-1c04c3d0893a>.

1 156. Defendant Williams also bragged that ICP is “backed by a large team of full-time engineers  
2 and cryptographers who are currently distributed across four dedicated international research centers, as  
3 well as remote teams.”<sup>71</sup>

4 157. Investors in ICP thus reasonably expected Dfinity, co-founder Defendant Williams, and  
5 Dfinity’s development team to provide significant managerial efforts after the Genesis launch.

6 158. This dependency, however, on the managerial efforts of Dfinity and Defendant Williams  
7 was not apparent at issuance to a reasonable investor. Considering the limited available information about  
8 how these ICP tokens were designed and intended to operate, if such an investor were even able to interpret  
9 the relevant law at the time, a reasonable investor lacked sufficient bases to conclude whether the ICP  
10 tokens were securities until the platform at issue, and its relevant “ecosystem,” had been given time to  
11 develop. In the interim, the investor lacked the facts necessary to conclude – let alone formally allege in  
12 court – that the tokens she had acquired were securities. It was only after certain revelations that provided  
13 more information about Defendant’s intent, Dfinity’s token economics, and how the governance structure  
14 of ICP tokens would resulting in the centralization in Dfinity, that an investor could reasonably determine  
15 that a token that was advertised as something other than a security was a security all along.

16 **5. Guidance from the SEC**

17 **a. The SEC’s 2019 Framework**

18 159. On April 3, 2019, the SEC published its “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of  
19 Digital Assets” (the “Framework”) in which it “provided a framework for analyzing whether a digital asset  
20 is an investment contract and whether offers and sales of a digital asset are securities transactions.”

21 160. The Framework described how to analyze the various facts surrounding an ICO in making  
22 the determination of whether a given digital asset is a security.

23 161. In particular, the Framework provides that the “inquiry into whether a purchaser is relying  
24 on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues: Does the purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the  
25 efforts of an [Active Participant or “AP”]? Are those efforts ‘the undeniably significant ones, those  
26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>71</sup> <https://medium.com/dfinity/how-ethereum-could-be-supercharged-by-the-internet-computer-network-afc513bf15e1>.

1 essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise,’ as opposed to efforts that  
2 are more ministerial in nature?”

3 162. The Framework further notes that the “stronger the[ ] presence” of the following factors,  
4 “the more likely it is that a purchaser of a digital asset is relying on the ‘efforts of others.’”

5 163. The first factor the SEC looked at was whether an AP is responsible for the development,  
6 improvement (or enhancement), operation, or promotion of the network, particularly if purchasers of the  
7 digital asset expect an AP to be performing or overseeing tasks that are necessary for the network or digital  
8 asset to achieve or retain its intended purpose or functionality.

9 164. At the time of the Genesis launch, Defendants actively market the Genesis launch and  
10 the Internet Computer project, thereby necessitating the continued managerial efforts of Dfinity and  
11 Defendant Williams. Where the network or the digital asset is still in development and the network or  
12 digital asset is not fully functional at the time of the offer or sale, purchasers would reasonably expect an  
13 AP to further develop the functionality of the network or digital asset (directly or indirectly).

14 165. Another factor the Framework considers is whether the AP creates or supports a market  
15 for, or the price of, the digital asset. This includes, *inter alia*, whether the AP “(1) controls the creation  
16 and issuance of the digital asset; or (2) takes other actions to support a market price of the digital asset,  
17 such as by limiting supply or ensuring scarcity, through, for example, buybacks, “burning,” or other  
18 activities.”

19 166. As noted above (*see supra*, ¶¶132-33), all of the ICP tokens in circulation were created at  
20 the direction of Dfinity and Defendant Williams. Additionally, Dfinity and Defendant Williams also  
21 created the protocols by which the ICP tokens are burned in the software canisters.

22 167. The Framework also looks to whether the AP “plays a lead or central role in deciding  
23 governance issues . . . that occur with respect to the digital asset.”

24 168. As noted above, the ICP tokens provide various governance rights over the Internet  
25 Computer project, and the token economics structure (that was designed and implemented by Dfinity)  
26 results in the centralization of those rights within Defendants.

1           169. The framework further states that “An AP has a continuing managerial role in making  
2 decisions about or exercising judgment concerning the network or the characteristics or rights the digital  
3 asset represents[.]”

4           170. Here, Dfinity and Defendant Williams have discussed the long-term prospects on decade-  
5 long time frames, continually noting how the Internet Computer will “evolve” in the future.

6           171. For example, when discussing “WebAssembly specification” in Dfinity noted it would be  
7 “adding support for new features as they become mature enough.” Similarly, Dfinity remarked that “Over  
8 a longer time horizon, we expect to see end-to-end formally verified WebAssembly execution  
9 environments, for additional security.”<sup>72</sup>

10           172. The ability to determine whether and where the digital asset will trade is another factor  
11 discussed in the Framework. For example, “purchasers may reasonably rely on an AP for liquidity, such  
12 as where the AP has arranged, or promised to arrange for, the trading of the digital asset on a secondary  
13 market or platform.”

14           173. Here, Dfinity’s website admits that the control of the “flow of liquid ICP tokens around the  
15 network” was “very important” to ICP’s success.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, Dfinity scheduled the ICP tokens’  
16 released “for the safety and security of ICP holders, the network, and its users while the underlying  
17 technology is be[ing] fettled and its ecosystem is being established.”<sup>74</sup>

18           174. Another factor the Framework notes is whether the AP has the ability to determine who will  
19 receive additional digital assets and under what conditions. This could be, for example, “[m]aking or  
20 contributing to managerial level business decisions, such as how to deploy funds raised from sales of the  
21 digital asset.”

22           175. Here, Dfinity, along with the Controlling Defendants, are the arbiters of funding for Internet  
23 Computer project. For example, in September 2020, Dfinity and the Controlling Defendants created the

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>72</sup> Dfinity, *A Closer Look at Software Canisters, an Evolution of Smart Contract* (Oct. 7, 2020),  
[https://medium.com/dfinity/software-canisters-an-evolution-of-smart-contracts-internet-computer-  
f1f92f1bffff](https://medium.com/dfinity/software-canisters-an-evolution-of-smart-contracts-internet-computer-f1f92f1bffff).

26 <sup>73</sup> Dfinity, *How to Access ‘Seed’ and ‘Airdrop’ ICP Tokens and Participate in the Internet Computer*  
27 *Network* (May 10, 2021), [https://medium.com/dfinity/how-to-access-seed-and-airdrop-icp-tokens-and-  
participate-in-the-internet-computer-network-e6cd663a0c3c](https://medium.com/dfinity/how-to-access-seed-and-airdrop-icp-tokens-and-participate-in-the-internet-computer-network-e6cd663a0c3c).

28 <sup>74</sup> *Id.*



1 “Beacon Fund,” which provided \$14 million in funding to support those building software on the Internet  
2 Computer.<sup>75</sup>

3 176. Dfinity also announced that the Foundation has provided over \$225 million in “non-dilutive  
4 financing in the form of developer grants to teams building on the Internet Computer” as a part of Dfinity’s  
5 Developer Ecosystem Program.<sup>76</sup>

6 177. Making other managerial judgements or decisions that will directly or indirectly impact the  
7 success of the network or the value of the digital asset generally.

8 178. The Framework also remarks that purchasers would reasonably expect the AP to undertake  
9 efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value of the network or digital asset, including, but not  
10 limited to, the instances where the AP “has the ability to realize capital appreciation from the value of the  
11 digital asset. This can be demonstrated, for example, if the AP retains a stake or interest in the digital  
12 asset.” According to the SEC, in these instances, “purchasers would reasonably expect the AP to undertake  
13 efforts to promote its own interests and enhance the value of the network or digital asset.”

14 179. Here, Defendants retain a significant interest in the Internet Computer project even after  
15 selling off many ICP tokens at the height of the Genesis launch (*see supra*).

16 **b. SEC’s Previous Statements and Findings**

17 180. On May 7, 2021, on CNBC’s “Squawk Box” television program, chairman of the SEC Gary  
18 Gensler stated that “a lot of crypto tokens – I won’t call them cryptocurrencies for this moment – *are*  
19 *indeed securities*[.]”<sup>77</sup> In addition to being the Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Gensler is also a world  
20 renowned expert on cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, having taught the “Blockchain and  
21  
22  
23

24 <sup>75</sup> Dfinity, *DFINITY Announces CHF 200 Million Program to Support the Internet Computer  
25 Developer Ecosystem* (May 25, 2021), [https://medium.com/dfinity/dfinity-announces-chf-200-million-  
26 program-to-support-the-internet-computer-developer-ecosystem-c65aa290548c](https://medium.com/dfinity/dfinity-announces-chf-200-million-program-to-support-the-internet-computer-developer-ecosystem-c65aa290548c).

26 <sup>76</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>77</sup> Jesse Point, *SEC Chairman Gary Gensler says more investor protections are needed for bitcoin  
28 and crypto markets* (May 7, 2021), [https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/07/sec-chairman-gary-gensler-says-  
more-investor-protections-are-needed-for-bitcoin-and-crypto-markets.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/07/sec-chairman-gary-gensler-says-more-investor-protections-are-needed-for-bitcoin-and-crypto-markets.html).

1 Money” course at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
2 (“MIT”).<sup>78</sup> [Emphasis added.]

3 181. In a June 14, 2018 speech entitled “Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary  
4 (Plastic)” that is available on the SEC’s website,<sup>79</sup> the following observations were made on “when a digital  
5 transaction may no longer represent a security offering”:

6 If the network on which the token or coin is to function is sufficiently decentralized – where  
7 purchasers would no longer reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential  
8 managerial or entrepreneurial efforts – the assets may not represent an investment contract.  
9 Moreover, when the efforts of the third party are no longer a key factor for determining the  
10 enterprise’s success, material information asymmetries recede. As a network becomes  
11 truly decentralized, the ability to identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite  
12 disclosures becomes difficult, and less meaningful.

13 And so, when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central third party whose efforts are a  
14 key determining factor in the enterprise. The network on which Bitcoin functions is  
15 operational and appears to have been decentralized for some time, perhaps from inception.

16 182. A key factor in determining whether a digital asset is a security or not is whether there  
17 is a centralized entity behind the digital asset.<sup>80</sup>

18 183. As discussed above, the structure of the ICP token’s governance structure is far from  
19 decentralized.

20 184. Finally, the SEC also already concluded that another virtual currency (*i.e.*, DAO tokens)  
21 that substantially similar to ICP are “securities and therefore subject to the federal securities laws.” As  
22 stated by the SEC, “issuers of distributed ledger or blockchain technology-based securities must register  
23 offers and sales of such securities unless a valid exemption applies.”<sup>81</sup>

24 <sup>78</sup> Lectures and Materials from Chairman Gensler’s MIT course are available to the public for free at:  
25 <https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-s12-blockchain-and-money-fall-2018/video-lectures/session-1-introduction/>.

26 <sup>79</sup> William Hinman, *Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)*, Remarks at the  
27 Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit, Crypto (June 14, 2018), <https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418>.

28 <sup>80</sup> *Id.* (noting that the “decentralized structure” of Bitcoin and Ethereum placed these digital assets  
outside the “disclosure regime of the federal securities laws”).

<sup>81</sup> Press Release: *SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities*, SEC (July 25, 2017), <https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131>.

1 **6. Crypto Community Sentiment**

2 185. The cryptocurrency community has been “wary” of the Internet Computer project since it  
3 burst onto the market with the Genesis launch seemingly from out of nowhere. One of the key complaints  
4 raised concerns the governance structure of the ICP token economics.

5 186. As discussed above, ICP token holders are given various governance and voting rights over  
6 the Internet Computer Project. Put another way, ICP is a “governance token, meaning holders of ICP  
7 having voting power on Internet Computer proposals.”<sup>82</sup>

8 187. However, “Dfinity’s grandiose vision for the ICP has been greeted with a mixed reaction  
9 among many in the crypto community, with questions raised over how decentralized the project’s  
10 governance actually is.”<sup>83</sup> As reported in CoinTelegraph.com’s May 26, 2021 article “\$223M fund for  
11 Internet Computer builders – but community is wary”:

12 In an illustrative thread on the “r/dfinity” subreddit on May 25, user “u/Additional\_Plant”  
13 noted “I don’t doubt that it is a powerful, game changing project. But that doesn’t mean  
14 it’s good for us common folks,” adding that: “There are too many red flags. For all intents  
15 and purposes, Dfinity have total control through the NNS. Is it really a crypto? Not really.  
16 Is it actually decentralized? Far from it.”<sup>84</sup>

17 188. Coin Bureau reported that the governance issue with ICP was a “nightmarish scenario”  
18 where “what the Dfinity Foundation is trying to do with the internet computer is not eliminate the tyranny  
19 of today’s tech giants, but instead crown themselves as rulers of the internet.” The video further elaborated  
20 on the “huge problem” this issue presented, noting that:

21 While the amount of ICP tokens allocated to the Dfinity Foundation and its affiliates is not  
22 greater than 50%, they are likely the only entities who are willing to lock their tokens for  
23 that eight-year [maturation] period. The longer you lock your ICP in NNS, the more voting  
24 power and the more ICP rewards you have and the more ICP you earn from inflation. These  
25 can then be compounded back into governance. **What this means is the Dfinity Foundation  
26 has total control over the internet computer. It can probably vote on whatever proposals  
27 it wants and this voting power will only increase over time if its tokens stay locked.**<sup>85</sup>

28 \* \* \*

24 <sup>82</sup> Brenden Rearick, *Internet Computer (ICP) Crypto: 10 Things to Know as ICP Snags No. 8 Spot*,  
25 INVESTORPLACE.COM (May 12, 2021), <https://investorplace.com/2021/05/internet-computer-icp-crypto-10-things-to-know-as-icp-snags-no-8-spot/>.

26 <sup>83</sup> *Internet Computer (ICP): BIGGEST Launch of 2021??*, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGrFj3pav\\_A](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGrFj3pav_A).

27 <sup>84</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>85</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).

1 189. As Coin Bureau observed in its ICP video: “That doesn’t sound at all like a cryptocurrency.  
2 ...”<sup>86</sup>

3 190. In sum, Defendant marketed and sold ICP as a security under the guise of it being a  
4 cryptocurrency. And Dfinity promoted the Internet Computer as being decentralized when its token  
5 governance and economics scheme would inevitably result in control over the Internet Computer becoming  
6 centralized in Defendants. Due to Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, investors have suffered massive  
7 damages as the price of ICP has fallen from highs of \$731 to a low of \$20.08 on June 14, 2021. As of the  
8 date of filing, the price of ICP is approximately \$36.

9 **G. Dfinity Directly Passed Title to ICP Investors**

10 191. According to the transaction history publicly available on the Internet Computer  
11 blockchain, which is corroborated by the findings in the Arkham Report, Dfinity deposited  
12 approximately 3.1 million ICP tokens, worth around \$744 million at the time, on various exchanges  
13 on opening day of the Genesis Launch on May 10, 2021. The majority of those deposits were made  
14 onto the Coinbase exchange where Plaintiff Ocampo made his purchases. In particular, Dfinity  
15 deposited approximately two million ICP tokens (valued at approximately \$480 million) to three  
16 Coinbase custodial wallet addresses.

17 192. During the creation of the ICP Tokens on May 6, 2021, a total of 469,212,166 ICP  
18 tokens were minted. One particular wallet, Wallet Address  
19 125013e95bd5e008bd6d26f86f5ddda2b16c382372b3067672505c1f11418817 (the “Dfinity Wallet”),  
20 received 107,024,038 ICP tokens. This was roughly 23% of all ICP Tokens minted. This percentage of  
21 the Float tracks closely to both the number of ICP Tokens and related percentage amounts of all minted  
22 ICP Tokens that the Dfinity Foundation received prior to the Genesis Launch. The Dfinity Wallet is  
23 directly owned and controlled by the Dfinity Foundation.

24 193. The Internet Computer blockchain demonstrates that the Dfinity Wallet used several  
25 pass-through wallets to transfer ICP Tokens onto various cryptocurrency exchanges, including  
26 Coinbase.

27  
28 <sup>86</sup> *Id.*

1 194. In particular, the Dfinity Wallet made a total of nine deposits of ICP Tokens that  
2 supplied the trading liquidity to Coinbase on opening day. Nine pass-through wallet addresses  
3 received those deposits and, in turn, transferred the ICP Tokens to three custodial wallet addresses  
4 that provided the trading liquidity for Coinbase on May 10, 2021. These nine deposits by Dfinity  
5 provided all of the liquidity for ICP trading on Coinbase on the first day of the Genesis Launch.

6 195. The specific wallet addresses are as follows:

7 *Pass-Through Wallets*

- 8 • 87e57a268b99be0568254159f85279321abb7b2b391ef96f35ae03ef82cd03ac  
9 (“Pass-Through Wallet 1”)
- 10 • e4aee62593ec8a660066df4c15dd704d91ecdd082fe19c0fb6d77e50f99c9922  
11 (“Pass-Through Wallet 2”)
- 12 • 7b8c0a103851d344b09f278fd52533b16a887f7d3a8cd0c20f999fbfbf262056  
13 (“Pass-Through Wallet 3”)
- 14 • 0032a91f86c8aa3982bdc7ce0899d47c072b11bd3a805dd8e69d1f35004465ea  
15 (“Pass-Through Wallet 4”)
- 16 • cb749bf3c884df6bf0a4738f0c106446710e269166e3c9955208697502f096ba  
17 (“Pass-Through Wallet 5”)
- 18 • 05ad474665f1eec0714c1a4ec941c3a395c703e14bb43100bd946d80b87828af  
19 (“Pass-Through Wallet 6”)
- 20 • 27d17170508492a35f5b0a5cd62ba7fefb43a24.e09daa41239b6d5c9c67a613f  
21 (“Pass-Through Wallet 7”)
- 22 • 00504a7e1190451cb96bd51d059ba2f9f415a5dc955203c5d132cb1a86a282bb  
23 (“Pass-Through Wallet 8”)
- 24 • 000a1f0436e925af8ae9ca45786f0ae85bd66f357fb0d19c9d3320e180710cf1  
25 (“Pass-Through Wallet 9”)

26 *Custodial Wallets*

- 27 • dd15f3040edab88d2e277f9d2fa5cc11616ebf1442279092e37924ab7cce8a74  
28 (“Coinbase Wallet 1”)

- 660b1680dafaedaa68c1f1f4cf8af42ed1dfb8564646efe935a2b9a48528b605  
("Coinbase Wallet 2")
- a6ed987d89796f921c8a49d275ec7c9aa04e75a8fc8cd2dbaa5da799f0215ab0m  
("Coinbase Wallet 3")

196. An examination of the transactions in these wallet addresses shows how Dfinity was able to sell its ICP Tokens directly to investors on Coinbase, including to Plaintiff who received title from Dfinity to the ICP Tokens he purchased shortly after the opening of the Genesis Launch.<sup>87</sup>

197. For example, on May 10, 2021, a few hours prior to the time of the Genesis launch, the Dfinity Wallet, over the course of three transactions, transferred 200,001 total tokens to Pass-Through Wallet 5. Within minutes of receipt, Pass-Through Wallet 5 sent 200,000 ICP Tokens (valued at \$48M) to Coinbase Wallet 1.

198. Similarly, Pass-Through Wallet 8 received its ICP Tokens directly from the Dfinity Wallet and two minutes later sent those 40,000 ICP Tokens (valued at \$9.6M) to Coinbase Wallet 1.

199. Pass-Through Wallet 9 likewise sent 626,515 ICP Tokens (valued at \$156.3M) to Coinbase Wallet 1 within two minutes after receiving them from the Dfinity Wallet.

200. Pass-Through Wallet 1 received 1,000,000 ICP Tokens from Wallet Address 32c46b6795b0993b9f2edf1845f52eebce172ff2db5e1a76b6af08163955937d ("Top Level Pass-Through Wallet"), which, had received those ICP Tokens directly from the Dfinity Wallet. Shortly thereafter, Pass-Through Wallet 1 transferred 100,000 of those ICP Tokens (valued at \$24M) to Coinbase Wallet 1.

201. A similar series of transfers can be tracked based on the transaction history of Coinbase Wallet 2. Within three hours of the Genesis Launch, the Dfinity Wallet transferred 200,000 ICP

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<sup>87</sup> This examination covers transactions occurring prior to the actual moment the ICP Tokens were publicly launched on exchanges, including Coinbase. Notably, according to the Internet Computer blockchain, the same pass-through wallets and Coinbase custodial wallets discussed herein continued to pass title to retail investors in a similar fashion to what transpired leading up to the Genesis Launch. Moreover, the Internet Computer blockchain also shows that the same pass-through wallets similarly supplied liquidity to other cryptocurrency exchanges like Huobi, OKEx and Binance. Thus, while Dfinity alone provided all of the liquidity available on Coinbase at the open of listing day and, thus, passed title to Plaintiff who purchased ICP Tokens shortly after the launch began, the Internet Computer blockchain transactions publicly available show that Dfinity continued to pass title in a similar fashion to Plaintiff and other class members after opening day by continuing to supply ICP tokens to satisfy the artificially high demand.

1 Tokens (valued at \$48M) to Wallet Address 7. Two minutes later Wallet Address 7 sent those ICP  
2 Tokens to Coinbase Wallet 2.

3 202. Coinbase Wallet 3 shows this same pattern of transactions. Pass-Through Wallet 3  
4 received ICP Tokens directly from the Dfinity Wallet. Minutes later, Pass-Through Wallet 3 sent 75,000  
5 ICP Tokens (valued at \$18M) to Coinbase Wallet 3.

6 203. The transaction histories of Coinbase Wallets 1-3 shows that these wallets each have  
7 more than ten thousand transactions. The sheer volume of transactions indicates that these are not an  
8 individual investor's wallets but rather that they belong to an exchange that is facilitating trading on  
9 its platform. Upon information and belief, Coinbase Wallets 1-3 are the custodial wallets owned and  
10 directly controlled by Dfinity.

11 204. Coinbase's own terms of service demonstrate that it was Dfinity, and not an  
12 intermediary, that directly passed title to Plaintiff and class members who purchased ICP Tokens on  
13 Coinbase beginning on May 10, 2021, during opening of the Genesis Launch. According to the  
14 Coinbase User Agreement's relevant sections on title and ownership of digital assets (like ICP):

15 **2.6. Digital Asset Custody and Title.** All Supported Digital Assets held in your  
16 Digital Asset Wallet are custodial assets held by Coinbase for your benefit, as  
described in further detail below.

17 **2.6.1 Ownership.** *Title to Supported Digital Assets shall at all times remain with you  
and shall not transfer to Coinbase.* As the owner of Supported Digital Assets in your  
18 Digital Asset Wallet, you shall bear all risk of loss of such Supported Digital Assets.  
Coinbase shall have no liability for Supported Digital Asset fluctuations or loss. *None  
19 of the Supported Digital Assets in your Digital Asset Wallet are the property of, or  
shall or may be loaned to, Coinbase; Coinbase does not represent or treat assets in  
20 User's Digital Asset Wallets as belonging to Coinbase.* Coinbase may not grant a  
security interest in the Supported Digital Assets held in y.our Digital Asset Wallet.  
21 Except as required by law, or except as provided herein, Coinbase will not sell,  
transfer, loan, hypothecate, or otherwise alienate Supported Digital Assets in your  
22 Digital Asset Wallet unless instructed by you.

23 **2.6.2. Control.** You control the Supported Digital Assets held in your Digital Asset  
Wallet. . . .

24 \* \* \*

25 **2.8. Coinbase Vault.** You may elect to hold Supported Digital Assets in Coinbase  
26 Vault. Coinbase Vault allows you to create conditions around transfer of your  
Supported Digital Assets, which may include adding third-parties to approve  
27 withdrawals ("Approvers"). *For the avoidance of doubt, title to Supported Digital  
Assets in Coinbase Vault shall at all times remain with you, and Approvers shall  
28 have no ownership interest in such Supported Digital Assets.*





1 The members of the proposed Class may be identified from records maintained by the Company and may  
2 be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using customary forms of notice that are commonly used  
3 in securities class actions.

4 211. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of  
5 the Class are similarly affected by Defendants' wrongful conduct.

6 212. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has  
7 retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.

8 213. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate  
9 over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact  
10 common to the Class are:

11 (a) whether ICP are securities under the Securities Act;

12 (b) whether the sale of ICP violates the registration requirements of the Securities Act;

13 and

14 (c) to what extent Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained damages and  
15 the proper measure of damages.

16 214. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  
17 adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages  
18 suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual  
19 litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them.  
20 There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.

21 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

22 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

23 **Unregistered Offering and Sale of Securities in Violation of**  
24 **Sections 5 and 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act**  
25 **(Against All Defendants)**

26 215. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, realleges and incorporates  
27 herein by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, and  
28 further alleges as follows:

1           216. Defendants, and each of them, by engaging in the conduct described above, directly or  
2 indirectly, made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce  
3 or of the mails, to offer to sell or to sell securities, or to carry or cause such securities to be carried through  
4 the mails or in interest commerce for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.

5           217. ICP are securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.  
6 §77b(a)(1).

7           218. Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased ICP securities.

8           219. No registration statements have been filed with the SEC or have been in effect with respect  
9 to any of the offerings alleged herein. No exemption to the registration requirement applies.

10          220. SEC Rule 159A provides that, for purposes of Section 12(a)(2), an “issuer” in “a primary  
11 offering of securities” shall be considered a statutory seller. 17 C.F.R. §230.159A(a). The Securities Act  
12 in turn defines “issuer” to include every person who issues or proposes to issue any security. 15 U.S.C.  
13 §77b(a)(4). Dfinity is an issuer of ICP.

14          221. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that statutory sellers under §12(a)(1) also include “the  
15 buyer’s immediate seller” and any person who actively solicited the sale of the securities to plaintiff and  
16 did so for financial gain. *See Pinter v. Dahl*, 486 U.S. 622, 644 n.21 & 647 (1988); *accord, e.g., Steed*  
17 *Finance LDC v. Nomura Sec. Int’l, Inc.*, No. 00 Civ. 8058, 2001 WL 1111508, at \*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,  
18 2001). That is, §12(a)(1) liability extends to sellers who actively solicit the sale of securities with a  
19 motivation to serve their own financial interest or those of the securities owner. *Pinter v. Dahl*, 486 U.S.  
20 622, 647 (1988); *Capri v. Murphy*, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988). Dfinity and the Controlling  
21 Defendants are all statutory sellers.

22          222. By reason of the foregoing, each of the Defendants have violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and  
23 12(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§77e(a), 77e(c), and 771(a).

24          223. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unregistered sale of securities, Plaintiff and  
25 the Class have suffered damages in connection with their ICP purchases.

1 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

2 **Violation of Section 15 of the Securities Act**  
3 **(Against Dfinity and the Controlling Defendants)**

4 224. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, realleges and incorporates  
5 herein by reference, each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint,  
6 and further alleges as follows:

7 225. This Count is asserted against Defendants Dfinity and the Controlling Defendants  
8 (collectively, the “Control Person Defendants”) under Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77o.

9 226. The Control Person Defendants, by virtue of their offices, ownership, agency, agreements  
10 or understandings, and specific acts were, at the time of the wrongs alleged herein, and as set forth herein,  
11 controlling persons within the meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act. The Control Person Defendants,  
12 and each of them, had the power and influence and exercised the same to cause the unlawful offer and sale  
13 of ICP securities as described herein.

14 227. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, possess, directly or indirectly, the  
15 power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of Dfinity, through ownership of  
16 voting securities, by contract, subscription agreement, or otherwise.

17 228. The Control Person Defendants also have the power to direct or cause the direction of the  
18 management and policies of Dfinity.

19 229. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, have sufficient influence to have  
20 caused ICP and/or Dfinity to submit a registration statement.

21 230. The Control Person Defendants, separately or together, jointly participated in Dfinity’s  
22 and/or ICP’s failure to register ICP.

23 231. By virtue of the conduct alleged herein, the Control Person Defendants are liable for the  
24 wrongful conduct complained of herein and are liable to Plaintiff and the Class for rescission and/or  
25 damages suffered.

26 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

27 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:  
28

1 A. Declaring this action to be a proper class action and certifying Plaintiff as Class  
2 representative;

3 B. Declaring that Defendants offered and sold unregistered securities in violation of Sections  
4 5(a), 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act;

5 C. Awarding Plaintiff and the other members of the Class rescission of their ICP purchases;

6 D. Awarding Plaintiff and the other members of the Class compensatory damages;

7 E. Awarding Plaintiff and the other members of the Class pre-judgment and post-judgment  
8 interest, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs and disbursements;

9 F. Requiring an accounting of all remaining assets and funds raised by Defendants through the  
10 sale of ICP;

11 G. Imposing a constructive trust over the assets and funds raised by Defendants through the  
12 sale of ICP;

13 H. Enjoining and restraining Defendants from violating the securities laws through the  
14 continued unregistered sale of ICP; and

15 I. Awarding Plaintiff and the other members of the Class such other and further relief as the  
16 Court may deem just and proper.

17 DATED: May 24, 2022

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